



AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISLAMIC SHARI'AH



Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ ①
الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ ② الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ ③
مَلِكِ يَوْمِ الدِّينِ ④ إِيَّاكَ نَعْبُدُ وَإِيَّاكَ نَسْتَعِينُ ⑤
اهْدِنَا الصِّرَاطَ الْمُسْتَقِيمَ ⑥ صِرَاطَ الَّذِينَ أَنْعَمْتَ
عَلَيْهِمْ غَيْرِ الْمَغْضُوبِ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا الضَّالِّينَ ⑦

اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى
سَيِّدِ رُسُلِكَ وَخَاتَمِ أَنْبِيَائِكَ
مُحَمَّدٍ وَآلِهِ الطَّيِّبِينَ الطَّاهِرِينَ
وَصَلِّ عَلَى جَمِيعِ الْأَنْبِيَاءِ وَالْمُرْسَلِينَ

*In the Name of Allāh,
The All-compassionate, The All-merciful*

*Praise belongs to Allāh, the Lord of all being,
the All-compassionate; the All-merciful;
the Master of the Day of Judgement;
Thee only, we serve, and to Thee alone we pray for succour;
Guide us in the straight path;
the path of those whom Thou hast blessed,
not of those against whom Thou art wrathful,
nor of those who are astray.*

** * * * **

*O Allāh! send your blessings to the head of
your messengers and the last of your prophets,
Muḥammad and his pure and cleansed progeny.
Also send your blessings to all your
prophets and envoys.*

Preface

The present work attempts to familiarize the readers with the *sharí'ah*, the Islamic legal system. Chapters One and Two define the need for the *sharí'ah* and explain how a Muslim can live by following the *sharí'ah*. Chapter Three is on *taqlíd*: a process in which the lay Shi'ahs follow the legal opinions of a living *mujtahid* (the expert of *sharí'ah*). Chapter Four deals with trend of rationalizing every *sharí'ah* law. Finally, Chapter Five, brings the reader closer to the system which a *mujtahid* uses in reaching to his opinions.

The first chapter is presented here for the first time. Chapter Two is a revised version of what I had written as an introduction to my book *The Ritual & Spiritual Purity* (1989). Chapters Three to Five are revised editions of booklets printed in the early- and mid-eighties in "The Laws of *Sharí'ah*" series in Vancouver, B.C. This series was very well received by the readers in various parts of the world. Imam Mahdi Association of Bombay has translated three booklets (which now form the last three chapters of this book) in Urdu and is using them as text for its study circle programs.

I pray to Allâh, *subhânahu wa ta'âla*, to make this work even more useful than the previous editions.

Rabí'u 'l-Awwal 1413
September 1992

S. M. Rizvi
Toronto, Canada

Chapter One

THE SHARÍ'AH

THE PLACE OF SHARÍ'AH IN ISLAM

The word "*sharí'ah*" literally means "a way." In Islamic terminology, it means the legal system of Islam. In this book, however, we will translate the word *sharí'ah* as the laws of Islam or the Islamic laws.

"Islam is a *dín* - a religion." What does a Muslim mean when he uses the word *dín* or religion in this sentence? Does it mean just "believing" in the fundamentals of Islam? Or does it mean just "living" according to the teachings of Islam without actually believing in God? No, both these explanations are incomplete. The word *dín* or religion, when used for Islam, means believing in the fundamentals as well as living according to the Islamic laws.

This concept of religion is beautifully conveyed in the terms used by Islamic scholars to describe the fundamental beliefs and the practical laws of Islam. The "beliefs" are described as "the roots of religion" (*usûlu 'd-dín*). The "*sharí'ah* laws" are described as "the branches of religion" (*furû' 'd-dín*). Beliefs without practice is incomplete Islam; and practice without belief may be useful in this world but not of much use in the hereafter.

The *sharí'ah* is a complete way of life; no aspect of human life is outside its domain. Islam expects a Muslim to follow its laws in every aspect of life: personal and familial, religious and social, moral and political, economic and business, etc. After all, "Muslim" means one who submits to God. The Qur'ân says: *When Allâh and His Messenger have decreed a matter, it is not for any believing man or believing woman to have a choice in their affair. And whosoever disobeys Allâh and His Messenger has gone astray into clear error.* (33:36)

WHAT IS THE NEED FOR THE *SHARÍ‘AH*?

Man's nature dictates that he can only function properly within a society, and a society depends for its existence on laws and regulations. Islam teaches that God has sent a series of messengers and prophets with divine laws for man's guidance from the very first day of his creation. The last Messenger was Prophet Muhammad (may peace and blessings of God be upon him and his family) who brought the final and the perfect message, Islam, as a guide for mankind till the end of time.

Many people think there is no need for God-made laws, we can make laws by ourselves. Islam believes that human being is a very sophisticated creature; and since he has not made his own body, nor did he create the world in which he lives, he, therefore, is not the best candidate for making laws about himself. Common sense says that when you buy a complicated equipment (for example, a computer), you should use it according to the "instruction manual" prepared by the manufacturer of that particular machine. To learn the computer by trial and error is not the smart way. Similarly, God as the Creator of man and the earth knows better how the human being should live.

The "instruction manual" that God sent for us is known as the Qur'ân. But human being is not just any ordinary machine; rather he is more complicated than the most advanced computer a human can ever produce. So God did not only send the Qur'ân - He also sent an instructor known as Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet of Islam brought the Qur'ân to us and also provided practical examples in his own life. According to Shí'ah Islam, after the Prophet, the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt are the protectors of the Qur'ân and the interpreters of its laws.

THE SUPERIORITY OF GOD-MADE LAWS OVER THE MAN-MADE LAWS
At this point, I would like to point out the superiority of the Islamic laws over the man-made laws. Man-made laws are by necessity influenced by the law-makers' social and racial biases. The United

Nations Organisation is the best example of how policies are enforced only when it suits the interest of the super-powers. The rule of the game in man-made laws is not honesty and justice, it is “the might is right.”

God-made laws are superior because of the following facts:

- God is above class status;
- God is above racial prejudice;
- God is above the gender rivalry;
- God, as the Creator, fully knows the humans as well as the world in which they live.

God-made laws will be just and based on fully informed decision. Let me demonstrate the superiority of God-made laws by using the example of capital punishment.

The secular system always swings according to the mood of the people: sometimes, the people feel that capital punishment for murder is not right and so they pressure their representatives to vote against capital punishment. But when crime rates increase and serial murder cases occur more frequently, public opinion changes and the legislators are influenced in favour of capital punishment.

Actually both sides of this issue reflect the Judeo-Christian basis of the Western society. Judaism, on the one hand, insists on the principle of justice which demands “*an eye for an eye.*” On the other hand, Christianity promotes the principle of mercy by saying “*turn thy other cheek.*”

Islam, the final version of God-made laws, takes a balanced look at the issue of capital punishment and has beautifully accommodated both the principles of justice and mercy in its system. The Western system did not realize the difference between the two principles of justice and mercy: while justice can be demanded and legislated, mercy cannot be forced or made into a law. You can always plead for mercy but you can never demand mercy.

Islam takes this difference into full consideration, and, therefore, it talks about the capital punishment on two different levels: legal and moral. On the legal level, it sanctions the principle of justice by giving the right of retaliation to the victim. But, immediately, the Qur'ân moves on to the moral level and strongly recommends the victim to forgo his right of retaliation and either to forgive the criminal or to settle for a monetary compensation. This issue has been clearly mentioned in the following verse of the Qur'ân:

In it (*the Torah*), We wrote to them: "A life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and there is retaliation for wounds." But (*before you act according to your right, remember that*) whosoever forgoes (*his right of retaliation*), it shall be an expiation for him (*against his own sins*). (5:45)

Thus Islam has very beautifully provided the legal safeguard for human life on the social level and also encouraged mercy from a moral point of view on the individual level. If human beings are left on their own in this issue, they will always swing between the two extremes of justice and mercy - only Islam, the final version of God-made legal system can accommodate both these principles.

*Chapter Two***HOW TO LIVE BY THE SHARÍ'AH?****DURING THE DAYS OF THE PROPHET**

The Muslims during the days of the Prophet Muhammad lived by the *Sharí'ah* by following the Qur'ân and the *sunnah*. *Sunnah* means the example of the Prophet.

Was not the Qur'ân enough on its own? The Qur'ân is a book of guidance which was sent for the entire human world till the end of time. As such, it only deals with the general issues and mentions only the basic principles underlying the Muslim way of life. The Qur'ân is more like a constitution than a book of law. The details were left to the Prophet. This is quite clear from the following verses of the Qur'ân:

He raised up among the common people a Messenger from among themselves to recite to them His revelations, to purify them, and to teach them the Book and the wisdom. (62:2)

And We have revealed to you (O Muhammad) the Reminder (*that is, the Qur'ân*) so you may clarify to the people what has been revealed to them, and so that they may reflect. (16:44)

These two verses definitely prove that Prophet Muhammad was not just a 'mail-man' whose only job was to deliver the Qur'ân to us. He was a teacher and a commentator of the Qur'ân. Even his actions are a source of guidance for Muslims:

You have a good example in Allâh's Messenger for whosoever hopes for God and the last day, and remembers God oft. (33:21)

The obedience to the Prophet has been considered as the proof of loving Allâh:

Say (O Muhammad), 'If you love Allâh, then follow me; (if you do so) Allâh will love you and forgive for you your sins.' (3:31)

To show the importance of obeying the Prophet, Allâh further says,
Whoever obeys the Prophet has surely obeyed Allâh. (4:80)

The Qur'ân is not only silent on the details of things which can change over time, it is also silent on the rules of worship which can never change. For example, the Qur'ân in twenty-five different places commands the Muslims to say the daily prayers (*salât*), but not once has Allâh explained how the Muslims are to say their prayers. (The only exception is that of *salâtu 'l-khawf*, the prayer said in a battle-field or when one is in danger.) This silence on the part of the Qur'ân, I believe, was for the specific purpose of forcing the people to go to the Prophet, ask him for details and follow his example.

DURING THE DAYS OF THE IMAMS

After the Prophet's death, the Muslims were very much divided on the issue of leadership. This gave birth to the two groups known as the Shí'ahs and the Sunnis. The Shí'ahs believed in the leadership of Imam 'Ali bin Abi Tâlib (a.s.) and the Sunnis believed in the leadership of Abu Bakr.

The Shí'ahs lived by the *sharí'ah* by following the Qur'ân, and the *sunnah* of the Prophet and of the Imams.

The *sunnah*, in Shí'ah definition, means "the sayings, deeds and silent approval of the Prophet and the twelve Imams of Ahlul-Bayt." Although the issue of the leadership is beyond the scope of this study, I would like to mention one reason why the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt are preferable as the source of the *sharí'ah* than anyone else.

The Muslims of the early days realized the importance of the Prophet's *sunnah* and started to memorize his sayings known as *hâdîth*. Later generations preserved the saying they had heard from the companions of the Prophet in the books of *hâdîth*. Even the actions of the Prophet, observed by his companions, were preserved in writing. But this

process of preserving the *sunnah* of the Prophet was not immune from mistakes and forgery. Many sayings were invented and wrongfully attributed to the Prophet during the early period of the Islamic history, specially during the Umayyid era. At times, the rulers bribed the companions to fabricate '*hādīth*' in their favour. At other times, some people invented *ahādīth* for apparently good causes not realizing that they were using wrong means of trying to make people more religious!

In this background of the early development of *hādīth*, we must find an authentic and informed source for the *sunnah* of the Prophet. When you look at the Muslims of the Prophet's days, you can find no one who was more knowledgeable, informed, reliable and closer to the Prophet than the Ahlu 'l-Bayt, the family of the Prophet: Fâtimah, 'Ali and their sons. After all, it is the Qur'ân which testifies to their spiritual purity of the highest form by saying, "*Verily Allâh intends to purify you, O Ahlu 'l-Bayt, a thorough purification*" (33:33)¹. Combine this verse about the Ahlu 'l-Bayt's purity with the following: "*It is the holy Qur'ân in a preserved tablet, none shall touch it but the purified ones*" (56:77-79). The real sense of this verse is that the Qur'ân which is "in a preserved tablet" is not accessible to anyone except those who are purified by Him. This shows that the Ahlu 'l-Bayt could understand the Qur'ân better than any other Muslim. It is for this very reason that Allâh commanded His Messenger to ask the people to love his Ahlu 'l-Bayt: "*Say (O Muhammad), I do not ask from you any reward (for teaching Islam to you) except to love my near ones*" (42:23)². This love was made obligatory because it would automatically entail obedience of those whom one loves. If the Ahlu 'l-Bayt were not truthful, reliable, and worthy of following, would Allâh command us to love them?

These few verses are enough to show that the best commentators of the

1 For details on this verse, see Rizvi, S.S.A., *Imâmate: The Vicegerency of the Holy Prophet* (Tehran: WOFIS, 1984) pp. 49-54.

2 For details on the love for the Ahlu 'l-Bayt, see Mutahhari, M., *Wilayah: the Station of the Master* (Tehran: WOFIS, 1982) pp. 50-62.

Qur'ân and the most authentic source for the Prophet's *sunnah* are the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt. The Prophet himself said, "I am leaving among you two worthy things. As long as you hold fast on to them both, you will never go astray after me. One is greater than the other: the Book of Allâh (which is a rope suspended from the heaven to the earth) and my descendants, my Ahlu 'l-Bayt. They will not separate from each other until they come to me at the (fountain of) Kawthar (in the hereafter). Therefore, see how you recompense me by the way you deal with them." This is not the place to discuss the authenticity of this *hâdîth*, but it will suffice to quote Ibn Hajar al-Makki, a famous Sunni polemicist. After recording this *hâdîth* from various companions who had heard it from the Prophet at various places and times, Ibn Hajar says, "And there is no contradiction in these [numerous reports] since there was nothing to prevent the Prophet from repeating [this statement] at those various places because of the importance of the holy Book and the pure Family."³

We can conclude from these verses and the *hâdîth* mentioned above that the Ahlu 'l-Bayt are the divinely appointed commentators of the Qur'ân, and the most authentic and the best source for the *sunnah*. It is for this reason that we prefer them to all other sources. Even when we quote a *hâdîth* from the Imams of Ahlu'l-Bayt, it is actually the *hâdîth* of the Prophet which they have preserved as the true successors of the last Messenger of God. Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.) says, "My *hâdîth* is the *hâdîth* of my father, the *hâdîth* of my father is that of my grandfather, the *hâdîth* of my grandfather is that of Husayn [bin 'Ali], the *hâdîth* of Husayn is that of Hasan [bin 'Ali], the *hâdîth* of Hasan is that of Amîru 'l-mu'minîn ['Abi bin Abi Tâlib], the *hâdîth* of Amîru 'l-mu'minîn is that of the Messenger of God (s.a.w.), and the *hâdîth* of the Messenger is a statement of Allâh, the Almighty, the Great."⁴

3 Al-Makki, Ibn Hajar, *as-Sawâ'iqu 'l-Muhriqah*, chapter 11, section 1. Also see S.S.A. Rizvi, *Imāmate*; Sharafu 'd-Din al-Musawi, *The Right Path*; and S.M.H. Jafry, *The Origin and Early Development of Shi'a Islam*.

4 In Shī'ah sources, see al-Kulayni, *al-Usūl mina 'l-Kāfi*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Dāru 'l-Kutubi 'l-Islāmiyyah, 1388 AH) p. 52; in Sunni sources, see ash-Sha'rāni, *at-Tabaqātu 'l-Kubra*, vol. 1, p. 28; Abu Nu'aym, *Hilyatu 'l-Awliyā'*, vol. 3, p. 193, 197.

The historical circumstances did not allow the opportunity to the first three Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt to teach and train their followers in the matters of the *sharí'ah*. It was after the tragedy of Karbala that the Imams, especially the fifth and the sixth Imams, got the opportunity to formally train their followers in the *sharí'ah* laws. The training by these Imams actually laid the foundation for the development of *ijtihâd* and *taqlíd* among the Shí'ahs after the occultation of the twelfth Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi (a.s.).

DURING THE GHAYBAT OF THE PRESENT IMAM

During the Minor Occultation (*ghaybat*) of the present Imam, it was still possible for the Shí'ahs to present their problems to the Imam through his specially appointed representatives. These representatives were 'Uthman bin Sa'id al-'Amri (260-265 A.H. / 875-879 C.E.), Muhammad bin 'Uthman al-'Amri (265-305 A.H. / 879-917 C.E.), Husayn bin Ruh (305-326 A.H. / 917-937 C.E.) and 'Ali bin Muhammad al-Samiri (326-329 A.H./ 937-940 C.E.).

However, after the Imam went into the Major Occultation, the problems of the *sharí'ah* were resolved through the process known as *ijtihâd* and *taqlíd* - the two most important ways of living by the *sharí'ah*.

* * *

SUMMARY:

- During the days of the Prophet, the Muslims lived by the *sharí'ah* by following the Qur'ân and the *sunnah*.
- During the days of the eleven Imams and the Minor Occultation of the Present Imam, the Shí'ahs lived by the *sharí'ah* by following the Qur'ân and the *sunnah* of the Prophet and the Imams.
- During the Major Occultation of the Present Imam, the Shí'ahs, based on the training given to them by the previous Imams, developed the system of *ijtihâd* and *taqlíd*. Under this system,

one group of the community studies the science of Islamic laws, specializes in that field and produces *mujtahids*. The non-*mujtahid* Shí'ahs, who obviously forms the majority, follows the opinions of the *mujtahids* of their time in *sharí'ah* matters.

* * *

Chapter Three

TAQLÍD, FOLLOWING THE EXPERT¹

THE MEANING OF TAQLÍD

Taqlíd literally means “to follow someone”, “to imitate someone.” In Islamic legal terminology it means “to follow the *mujtahid* in religious laws.” However, this following is based on an informed decision taken by the individual Shí'ah man or woman. Before you start following the opinions of a *mujtahid* in the *sharí'ah* laws, you have to ascertain that he has the required expertise and that he is of upright character.

Taqlíd of a *mujtahid*, as explained in previous chapter, is only when we do not have direct access to our Present Imam (a.s.). If the Imam had been accessible to us, then we do not have to follow any *mujtahid*.

IS TAQLÍD REASONABLE?

It is not always unreasonable to follow others and to hold uncritical faith in them. We can logically distinguish four possible forms of imitation:

1. that of an ignorant person by an ignorant person;
2. that of a learned person by a more learned person;
3. that of an ignorant person by a learned person;
4. that of a learned person by a less learned person.

It is quite clear that the first three forms of imitations are unreasonable and can serve no purpose. However, the fourth kind of imitation is obviously not only reasonable, but also necessary and matter of common sense; in our everyday life we follow and imitate others in many things; we like to feel that we are taking the advice of experts in matters outside our own knowledge.

¹ This chapter was first published in *al-Serat* (London: vol. IX, No. 2, 1983); then it was published as a booklet in 1985/ 1405 in Vancouver.

Someone who wishes to build a house explains the basic idea of what he wants to the builder and then submits to his advice as to how he should go about the actual construction. The patient follows the treatment advised by his doctor; a litigant consults a lawyer when drawing up his case for a court. The examples are abundant; in most cases the advice is taken voluntarily, but sometimes the citizen may be required by law to seek expert advice and act upon it, before, for example, he is allowed to take some particularly dangerous drug. The clearest example is obviously in case of a legal dispute between two parties, when they are required to take their grievances before a judge and abide by his decision if they cannot settle their dispute amicably.

The practise of *taqlid* is an example of the same kind: the person who is not an expert in Islamic jurisprudence is legally required to follow the instructions of the expert, that is, the *mujtahid*. And in this case, the requirement is an obligation which must be observed, for it is an essential part of the divine law.

Once a person has come to accept Islam, it follows as a necessary consequence that he must adhere to the *sharí'ah* either by following a *mujtahid* (*taqlid*) or by undertaking the acquisition of learning and piety to such a degree that he becomes a *mujtahid* himself (*ijtihâd*).

SUPPORT FROM THE QUR'ÂN & SUNNAH

This sensible practise of following the *mujtahid* in *sharí'ah* laws has been endorsed by Islam.

The Qur'ân strongly exhorts at least a group of Muslims to devote their time and energy in studying religion. This obligation is of such importance that Allâh has exempted such persons from the duty of *jihâd*. He says: "*It is not (right) for the believers to go forth all together (for jihâd). So why should not a party from every section of them (the believers) go forth to become learned in the religion?...*" (9:124).

More interesting is the reason and purpose of their knowledge: " ...

to warn their people when they return to them, hopefully they may beware.” (9:124) This verse divides the people into two groups: those who are learned in religious sciences and those who are not. It is the duty of the learned to “warn” (a broad term which implies advice and guidance) the common people, and it is expected of the common people to “beware” (take heed of the learned persons' advice and follow). In *shari'ah* matters, this process of guiding the common people is technically known as “*ijtihâd*,” and the process of following the guidance by the common people is technically known as “*taqlîd*.”

The Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt (peace be upon them all) have endorsed this system in theory as well as in practise:

In Theory: In a famous *hâdîth*, 'Umar ibn Hanzalah asked Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.) about the legality of two Shí'ahs seeking a verdict from an illegitimate ruler (or a judge appointed by such a ruler) in a dispute over a debt or a legacy. The Imam's answer was that was absolutely forbidden to do so; and then he read the following verse: “... (Yet in a dispute) they desire to summon one another to the judgment of the *tâghûl*² though they were commanded to reject and disbelieve in him.” (4:60)

Then 'Umar ibn Hanzalah asked, “What the two (Shí'ahs) should do then?” The Imam replied, “They must seek out one of your own who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well-acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as judge over you. If the ruling which he based on our laws is rejected then this rejection will be tantamount to ignoring the order of Allâh and rejecting us and rejecting us is the same as rejecting Allâh, and this is the same as polytheism.”³

2 “*Tâghûl*” means any thing or person who is followed without authorization of God or his representatives. It is used for Satan, an Idol or even a human being who misleads others.

3 Shaykh al-Kulayni, *al-Usûl mina 'l-Kâfi*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Dâru 'l-Kutubi 'l-Islâmiyyah, 1379 AH) p. 67; *al-Furû' mina 'l-Kâfi*, vol. 7, p. 412. In al-Hurr al-'Âmili, *Wasâ'ilu 'sh-Shi'ah*, see vol. 18 (Beirut: Dâr Ihya' 'l-Turâthi 'l-'Arabi, 1391 AH) p. 99.

In another *hâdîth*, Abi Khadijah relates that Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.) sent him to his companions with the following message: "If a dispute or a difference occurs among you about a property, then take care not to seek judgement from those illegitimate [judges]; instead, you must seek a person who knows what is permissible and what is forbidden by us, for I appoint him as a judge over you. And take care that you do seek judgement against one another with an unjust ruler."⁴

The least that these two narrations prove is that the Shí'ahs are not allowed to refer to unauthorized judges for solution to their problems, instead they are advised to seek the guidance of those who are well-versed in the teachings of the Ahlu 'l-Bayt. In these *ahâdîth*, the practise of seeking the advice of experts in *sharí'ah* laws is taken for granted.⁵

In Practise: There are several documented cases of Shí'ahs who asked the Imams of their time to appoint someone to adjudicate between them in religious problems. Such questions were raised by those who lived far from Medina or those who could not gain access to their Imam in Medina itself.

1. 'Ali ibn al-Musayyab asked Imam 'Ali ar-Riza (a.s.): "I live far away and cannot always come to you, so from whom should I take the guidance for my religion?" The Imam replied, "From Zakariyyah bin 'Adam al-Qummi..."
2. 'Abdu 'l-'Azíz and Hasan bin 'Ali bin Yaqtín asked Imam 'Ali ar-Riza (a.s.), "I cannot always reach to you to ask about our

⁴ Al-'Āmili, *Wasā'ilu 'sh-Shí'ah*, vol. 18, p. 100 who has quoted it from at-Tusi, *Tahzibu 'l-Ahkâm*, vol. 6, p. 303.

⁵ Both the narrations quoted above are accepted by most of the Shí'ah scholars of *fiqh* and *hâdîth*. The *hâdîth* narrated by 'Umar ibn Hanzalah is considered as a "*maqbulah*" (acceptable) and that by Abi Khadijah is considered as a "*mash-hûrah*" (famous) *hâdîth*. See, for example, the par excellent *mujtahid* of the last century, Shaykh Murtaza al-Ansâri, *Kitâbu 'l-Makâsib* (Tabriz: 1375 AH) p. 154. Moreover, these *ahâdîth* have been used here as a secondary argument in favour of *taqlîd*; they are not initiating a process but just endorsing it.

problems about religious teachings. Is Yunûs bin 'Abdu 'r-Rahmân trustworthy enough for seeking religious guidance?" The Imam replied in affirmative.

3. 'Abdullâh bin Abi Ya'fûr asked Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.), "I do not meet you all the times nor is it possible for me to come [to you], and at times one of our friends would come to ask a question from me for which I would have no answer." The Imam said, "What does prevent you from [seeking guidance from] Muhammad bin Muslim ath-Thaqafi, for he has heard [many *ahâdîth*] from my father and was respectable in his views."
4. Shu'ayb al-'Araqufi asked Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.), "Sometimes we need to ask about certain things, so whom should we ask?" The Imam replied, "Take guidance from [Abu Basîr] al-Asadi."⁶

These few examples prove beyond doubt that the practise of seeking the guidance of those who are well versed in religion has been practically endorsed by the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.).

Let me end this section with the statement of Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi (a.s.) in answer to a letter sent by Ishâq bin Ya'qûb. The Present Imam (a.s.) says, "As for the newly occurring circumstances, you should turn (for guidance) to the narrators of our *hâdîth*, for they are my proof over you and I am Allâh's proof."⁷

6 *Wasâ'ilu 'sh-Shi'ah*, vol. 18, pp. 106, 107, 105, 103.

7 Shaykh as-Sadûq, *Kamâlu 'd-Dîn wa Tamâmu 'n-Ni'mah* (Tehran: Maktabatu 's-Sadûq, 1395 AH) p. 484; Shaykh at-Tusi, *Kitâbu 'l-Ghaybah* (Najaf: Maktabatu 's-Sâdiq, 1385 AH) p. 177; at-Tabrasi, *al-Ihtijâj*, vol. 2 (Najaf: Daru 'n-Nu'mân, 1966) p. 283. The text quoted above is from at-Tabrasi (c. 6th cent. AH). There is a variation in the last part of this *hâdîth* in books of at-Tusi (385-460 AH) and as-Sadûq (d. 381). Shaykh at-Tusi's version says, "... and I am Allâh's proof over you" referring to all Shi'ahs whereas Shaykh as-Sadûq's version says, "... and I am Allâh's proof over them" referring to the *mujtahids* only. Sadûq's version, who lived before Tusi, leaves absolutely no room for the speculation done by a contemporary writer (Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism*, p. 101) that Tusi's version "seems to have been tampered with" by the '*ulamâ*' of later or Safavid period (10th cent. AH) to promote their own power and status!

QUALIFICATIONS OF A *MUJTAHID*

Becoming an expert in *fiqh* and other Islamic sciences is not in itself enough for qualification as a *mujtahid* whom the lay Shí'ahs can follow.

In addition to this expertise, the Shí'ah laws lay down that a *mujtahid* should be an Ithnâ-'Ashari Shí'ah and *âdil*. *Âdil* can be translated as "just", but it includes other moral and legal qualities such as piety and abstention from all that the *sharí'ah* forbids and fulfillment of all its obligations.

Imam Hasan al-'Askari (a.s.) quotes a long *hâdîth* from Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.) in which the latter condemned the Jews for following the rabbis. Then the Imam said, "And, similarly, if the lay people of our *ummah* know in their *fuqahâ*⁸ open sinfulness, strong racial solidarity, greed for the vanities of this world and its forbidden things, opposition to their opponents who deserve to be helped, and help to their supporters who deserve to be opposed, then whoever from our people follow such *fuqahâ*, then they are like the Jews who have been condemned for following their rabbis." Then the Imam says:

"But if there is anyone among the *fuqahâ* who is in control over his own self, protects his religion, suppresses his evil desires and is obedient to the commands of his Master, then the people should follow him (*yuqalliduhu*)."

"And these qualities will not be found except in some Shí'ah *fuqahâ*, not all of them..."⁹

These conditions in general and the above *hâdîth* in particular, make it incumbent upon the believers to be vigilant.

How Can a Believer Know who is a *Mujtahid*?

There are three recognized ways by which a person can discover who is a *mujtahid*:

⁸ *Fuqahâ* is plural of *faqih* = expert of Islamic laws, *mujtahids*.

⁹ At-Tabrasi, *al-Ihtijâj*, vol. 2, p. 264.

- i. by his own personal knowledge if he is himself a religious scholar;
- ii. by the testimony of two *'ādil* and knowledgeable persons to someone's being a *mujtahid*;
- iii. by a degree of popularity which leaves no doubt about a person's being a *mujtahid*.

Once a *mujtahid* is followed by the Shí'ah community, he is known as *marja'u 't-taqlíd* -- one to whom people refer in *taqlíd*.

Most present day *'ulamâ'* maintain that it is highly desirable not to just follow any *mujtahid* but to follow a *mujtahid* who is *al-a'lam*. In a general sense this means "the most learned", but in this specific context it means the *mujtahid* who has the greatest expertise in deriving the rulings of the *sharí'ah* from its sources. The *a'lam* may be recognized in any of the three ways mentioned above.

However, it is sometimes difficult for the Shí'ah *'ulamâ'* to distinguish who among all the prominent *mujtahids* is the most learned, and, as a result, more than one *mujtahid* may be followed in *taqlíd* at one time (though not, of course, by the same person). This has been the case in the seventies and the eighties; but such multiplicity rarely results in any practical disagreement on legal matters within the Shí'ah community.

DIFFERENCES AMONG THE MUJTAHIDS IN THEIR LEGAL OPINIONS

Many people wonder why it is that the *mujtahids* sometimes differ in their religious opinions, or *fatwas*, when the bases of their *ijtihâd* are the same.

Firstly, any difference in the *fatwas* is never such as to be contradictory; it is almost impossible to find a case of one *mujtahid* saying some action is *wâjib* and another saying it is *harâm*.

Take, for instance, the case of the Friday prayer (*salâtu 'l-jum'ah*). All Shí'ah *mujtahids* believe that in the presence of the *ma'sûm* Imam,

this *salât* is obligatory on Fridays because it is the Imam or his representative who has the right to call the people to the Friday prayer; but they differ as to what is the correct course of action when the Imam is in Occultation.

The late Ayatullâh Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakím (d. 1970) was of the opinion that *salâtu 'l-jum'ah* is not obligatory during the Occultation of the Imam, but it does not matter if someone performs it supposing that it is expected of him, if he also prays the noon prayer (*salâtu 'z-zuhr*). Ayatullâh Sayyid Abul Qâsim al-Khû'í says that "one can choose between performing *salâtu 'z-zuhr* or *salâtu 'l-jum'ah*; but once the latter is established with all its conditions (fulfilled), then it is precautionarily obligatory (*ihtiyât wâjib*) to participate in it." Ayatullâh Sayyid Rûhullâh al-Khumayni says that "one can choose between performing *salâtu 'z-zuhr* or *salâtu 'l-jum'ah*; but if one chooses the latter, then it is advisable (*mustahab*) to precautionarily perform *salâtu 'z-zuhr* also." Although there are differences in the opinions of these *mujtahids*, there is no clash that would, for example, prevent the followers of one of them participating in *salâtu 'l-jum'ah* if it were established.

Secondly, the existence of differences in scientific opinions is not to be taken as a sign of a substantial defect in the quest for knowledge and a reason for abandoning it altogether; it is, rather, a sign that knowledge moves in progressive steps towards perfection. Differences of opinions are to be found in all sciences, not just in *fiqh*. There may, for example, be more than one opinion about the therapy for a particular patient's disease, and all of these opinions may be superseded later on by the development of a new method of dealing with that disease. Thus these observations can be seen to be relevant not only to differences between the opinions of contemporary scientists but also to historical differences, and all these differences should be regarded as signs of the dynamism within a science and as stages to be passed in its route to perfection.

It should be remembered that the *mujtahid* formulates his opinions after pushing his research and study as far as he can; that is all that is expected of him, for he is neither inerrant (*ma'sûm*) nor knower of the unseen (*'âlimu 'l-ghayb*). If the available sources of the *shari'ah* lead a *mujtahid* to a particular conclusion and, let us suppose that on the judgement, he comes to know that the actual *shari'ah* law was something else - then neither will he be punished for issuing that *fatwa* nor will his followers be punished for acting accordingly, because both had done what was humanly possible for them to do.

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Chapter Four

THE TENDENCY OF RATIONALIZING THE *SHARÍ'AH* LAWS¹

Why we have to pray five times a day? Why dogs and pigs are regarded as ritually impure animals? Why an animal slaughtered un-Islamically is forbidden and ritually impure? These are but a few of the many questions asked by our youths about the *sharí'ah* laws. They want to rationalize every law of the *sharí'ah*; they want to know the reason and purpose of the legislation of these laws.

This chapter deals with this tendency and attempts to explain the validity or otherwise of such a trend. Before explaining the validity or otherwise of rationalizing the *sharí'ah* laws, I would like to clarify the fundamental attitude of a Muslim towards the *sharí'ah*.

THE SCOPE OF RATIONALIZATION

Islam is a *dín* - religion. *Dín* means a complete way of life consisting of beliefs and laws (both legal and moral). To find the Islamic attitude about understanding religion, we have to study the Qur'ân and the *sunnah*. In the Qur'ân and the *sunnah*, we find two different attitudes towards two different aspects of *dín*. These two aspects of *dín* are: (a) the fundamental beliefs known as *usûl 'd-dín* - the roots of religion; (b) the *sharí'ah* laws known in general as *furû'u 'd-dín* - the branches of religion.

As for the “roots” of religion, Islam expects the Muslims to hold their belief in the fundamentals of their religion after attaining conviction of their truth through examination and reflection. The Qur'ân clearly condemns those who follow others blindly in matters of beliefs:

¹ This chapter was first published in 1984 (Vancouver), and then in 1985 (Vancouver).

There is no compulsion in the religion (of Islam because) truly the right path has become clearly distinct from error. (2:256)

Again the Qur'ân says:

And when it is said to them, "Come to what Allâh has sent down, and (to) the Messenger," they say, "Enough for us is what we found our fathers doings." What, even if their fathers had knowledge of naught and were not rightly-guided? (5:104)

This strong condemnation of the idol-worshippers for following their fore-fathers blindly has been repeated elsewhere:

And when it is said to them, "Follow what Allâh has sent down," they say, "No, but we will follow such things as we found our fathers doing." (2:170; 31:21)

Islam says that one may consider the views and opinions of others, but that one should only accept that which is reasonable to believe: "So (O Muhammad) give good tidings to My servants who give ear to the word and follow the fairest of it. Those are the ones whom Allâh has guided, and those are men possessed of minds." (39:17-18)

Likewise, in the books of *ahâdîth* we find the Prophet and the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt using intellectual arguments in matters of belief to convince their opponents or the seekers of truth. This itself is an example and *sunnah* for the Muslims to base their belief on understanding and conviction.

BUT as for the "branches" of religion, Islam expects absolute obedience from the Muslims. The reason for this expectation is very obvious: Once a person has believed, by his own free-will, in Allâh as the Creator and the Wise Author of laws, in Muhammad as the infallible Messenger of Allâh, and in the Qur'ân as the authentic message of Allâh - then it follows as a necessary consequence that he must adhere to the *sharí'ah* laws.

This absolute obedience about the *sharī'ah* laws can be inferred from the following verses:

It behoves not a believing man and a believing woman that they should have any choice in their affairs when Allāh and His Messenger have decided a matter; and whosoever disobeys Allāh and His Messenger, he surely has strayed off a manifest straying. (33:36)

O you who believe! Do not take precedence before Allāh and His Messenger (in *sharī'ah* matters), and fear Allāh; surely Allāh is Hearing, Knowing. (49:1)

O you who believe! Obey Allāh, obey the Messenger and those who are in authority among you (i.e., the Imams). (4:59)

We have not sent a Messenger but to be obeyed. (4:64)

To summarize: In Islamic beliefs, a Muslim is expected to believe only after reflection; and in Islamic laws, he is expected to follow them without any reservations.

THE CATEGORIES OF *SHARĪ'AH* LAWS

Now we come to the problem that why such and such law of the *sharī'ah* was legislated. Considering the reasons and purposes of the laws, the *sharī'ah* can be divided into four categories:

1. The laws whose **reasons and purposes are self evident**: For example, helping the needy is highly recommended; killing is forbidden; lying is evil; paying taxes like khums and zakat is obligatory. One does not need any expertise or extraordinary intelligence to know that helping the needy is good, paying taxes is necessary for preserving the financial equilibrium in the society; and that killing and lying is evil.
2. The laws whose **reasons and purposes have been explained in the Qur'ān and ḥadīth**: For example, intoxicants are forbidden, interest is prohibited, fasting in Ramadhan is obligatory and prayers are a must.

The Qur'ân and *hâdîth* have said that intoxicant is one of the main causes of evil because an intoxicated person is no longer in control of himself. Although it took the world a long time and a bitter experience to realize the wide-spread harm of drunkenness, Islam declared its harm and evil fourteen centuries ago by saying "*its sin is greater than its profit.*" (2:219)

Interest is forbidden in Islam. The Qur'ân and *hâdîth* have explained the harm of interest. Interest leads to destruction of the poor section of the society, and all wealth gravitates towards the already wealthy group.²

Fasting is a physical and spiritual training which brings the servants of Allâh nearer to Him and makes them more obedient to the *shari'ah*.

Prayers is a means of expressing our gratitude to Allâh - *O you who believe! Eat of the good things that We have provided you with and thank Allâh.* (2:172); it is an important way of achieving peace of mind - *surely by Allâh's remembrance are the hearts set at rest.* (13:28); and it is also a very effective method of making the believer more obedient to the laws of Islam - *surely the prayer keeps (one) away from indecency and evil.* (29:45)

There are many *ahâdîth* of our Imams explaining the reasons and purposes of many laws of the *shari'ah*. Shaykh as-Sadûq, the famous Shî'ite scholar, has collected many of these *ahâdîth* in his *'Ilalu 'sh-Sharâya'*.

3. The laws whose reasons and purposes have not been explained in the Qur'ân or *hâdîth*, but the rising horizon of human knowledge have helped in understanding their purpose and usefulness. For example, why pork is forbidden;³ why circumcision is highly

2 For a detailed discussion on interest, see 'Allâmah Tabâtabâ'î, *al-Mizân* trans. S.S.A. Rizvi, vol. 4 (Tehran: WOFIS, 1982) pp. 295-303.

3 For a detailed discussion on pork, see S.S.A. Rizvi, *Pork*, (Tehran: WOFIS, 1971).

recommended by the *sharí'ah*, and why only the fish which have scales is permitted in Shi'ah *fiqh*.

For the benefit of circumcision, we quote Sherman Silber who says that: "There are a number of reasons why circumcision is beneficial and why it ought best be performed in infancy. First, ...it prevents cancer of the penis in later life.... Cancer of penis generally occurs when there has been carelessness in taking care of one's foreskin.... A second benefit of circumcision is that the wives of circumcised men are less commonly afflicted with cancer of the cervix.... The most common benefit of circumcision is that it prevents accumulation of oils and secretions (called smegma) under the foreskin, which lead to infection, swelling, and sometimes contraction of the foreskin so the tip of the penis is trapped inside."⁴

About the fish, it has been said that the fish that do not have scales are harmful to human beings. Based on that research, American troops in the east were directed that "tropical marine fishes without scales were to be left alone."

It must be mentioned here that the reasons of the *sharí'ah* laws which have been discovered by human knowledge cannot be regarded as the actual reason (*ratio legis*) for the legislation of those laws, because the human knowledge is still in its infancy whereas Islam, the final *sharí'ah* of Alláh, is to stay in practise up to the end of this world. However, the scientific facts can be used to explain the usefulness and benefits of the *sharí'ah* laws.

4. The laws whose reasons and purposes have neither been explained in the Qur'ân and *hâdîth*, nor the new advancement in human knowledge has been able to explain them. For example, why four *rak'ats* (cycles) in noon, afternoon and night prayers while only three in evening and two in subh prayers.

4 Sherman Silber, *The Male* (New York: 1981) pp. 115-116.

THE RIGHT APPROACH

As far as the first three types of *sharí'ah* laws are concerned, there is not much problem in explaining their reasons and purposes. The problem arises when one starts to rationalize the laws which come under the fourth category.

On the laws of the fourth category, the only thing which can be said is that a Muslim should have complete faith that there surely are useful purposes in these types of laws. The purpose can be of material or spiritual nature, or both. Why should we have such a confidence in these laws of the *sharí'ah*? Because, we, the Shí'ah Ithnâ-'Ashari Muslims, believe that all the actions of Allâh have purpose, and that they are for the benefit of human beings; and this includes the laws of the *sharí'ah*.⁵ On basis of this belief, we must have confidence that all His laws (including those whose purposes are still unknown to us) have a purpose and benefit for human beings.

One more thing which must be clarified at this point is that it is not only the responsibility of the '*ulamâ*' (the scholars of Islamic religious sciences) to discover and explain the purpose and reason underlying the *sharí'ah* laws. Their primary duty is to explain the *sharí'ah* laws to the people. The responsibility for discovering and explaining the purposes of the *sharí'ah* laws must equally be shared by the Muslim intellectuals who are experts of modern science. Unfortunately, very few of the Muslim intellectuals are interested in this aspect of the *sharí'ah*, and those who are interested lack the knowledge of the Qur'ân and *hâdîth*. A bridge must be built between the religious and worldly sciences; and, thanks be to Allâh, some small steps in that direction have been taken in last few years.

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The belief that although we might not know the reason and purpose of

⁵ See 'Allâmah Hilli, *al-Bâbu 'l-Hâdî 'Ashar* trans. W.M. Miller, (London: Luzac, 1958) pp. 45-46; S.S.A. Rizvi, *Justice of God* (New Jersey: Pyam-e Aman, 1992) chap. 1.

a certain *sharí'ah* law, it surely has a good reason and useful purpose behind it can be understood from the following episode in the Qur'ân. This episode also shows that if we are made aware of its reasons, we would readily admit that it was the very right thing to do.

One day while preaching to his people, Prophet Musa (a.s.) thought about himself that Allâh has given him a great privilege and that he is the most learned among the mankind. Allâh was not pleased with even such a slight indication of pride in Musa's mind, and so Jibrail was sent to inform Musa that there is a person, among the servants of Allâh, who is more learned than him. He was also given an address to go and meet this more learned person. Musa, along with one of his disciples, went to meet the learned person who has not been named in the Qur'ân but our *ahâdîth* identify him as Khizr.

The Qur'ân narrates in (Surah al-Kahf, 18:60-82) the details of their meeting:

Musa: "Can I follow you so that you may teach me the right knowledge of what you have been taught (by Allâh)?"

Khizr: "Surely you cannot have patience with me. How can you have patience in (the things or actions) of which you do not have a comprehensive knowledge?"

Musa: "If Allâh wills, you will find me patient and I shall not disobey you in any matter."

Khizr: "If you would follow me, then do not question me about anything until I speak to you about it."

So they went their way until they reached a river where they embarked on a boat. When they were close to their destination, Khizr made a hole in the boat.

Musa: "Have you made a hole in it to drown its inmates? Surely you have done a grievous thing."

Khizr: "Did I not say that you will not be able to have patience with me?"

Musa: "O Khizr, do not blame me for what I forgot, and do not constrain me to a difficult thing in my affair."

Then they went on until they met a young man. Khizr killed that person.

Musa: "Have you killed an innocent person who had not killed anyone? Certainly you have done an evil thing."

Khizr: "Didn't I say to you that you will not be able to have patience with me."

Musa: "If I ask you about anything after this, then do not keep me in your company; indeed, you shall then have found an excuse in my case (to dismiss me from your company)."

They went on until they came to a town. They asked food from the people of that town, but no one accepted them as guests. In that town, they found a wall which was on the point of falling in ruin, so Khizr repaired the wall and put it into the right state.

Musa: "If you had wished, you might certainly have taken a payment for this work."

Khizr: "This is the parting between you and me. But before you leave, I will inform you of the significance of my actions which you could not understand:

- As for the boat, it belonged to some poor men who worked on the river. I wished to make the boat slightly defective because a king was coming behind them who seized every perfect boat by force.
- As for the young man, his parents were believers and I feared lest he would oppress them by rebellion and disbelief. And we desired that their Lord might give them in his place a better one than him in purity and nearer to having compassion.

- As for the wall, it belonged to two orphan boys in the city, and there was beneath it a treasure belonging to them; so I rebuilt the wall because your Lord desired that when they attain maturity, they should take out their treasure, which was a mercy from your Lord.

“And moreover, I did not do it of my accord. This is the significance of that on which you could not have patience.” (18:60-82)

There are many morals in this story. What is relevant to our discussion is that if a great Prophet of Allâh like Musa (a.s.) could not fully comprehend the significance of the actions of a fellow human being who was more learned than him, then how can we expect to know the wisdom and purpose of every *sharí’ah* law which has been legislated by Allâh, the Wise, the Omniscient and the Omnipotent Creator of the humans and the world in which they live!

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*Chapter Five***THE SYSTEM OF *IJTIHÂD*****SOME IMPORTANT TERMS**

Ijtihâd literally means “to endeavor, strive, put oneself out, work hard.” In Islamic legal terminology it means “the process of deriving the laws of the *sharí'ah* from its sources.”

Mujtahid means a person who does *ijtihâd* or who is an expert of Islamic laws.

Fiqh literally means knowledge, and in Islamic terminology it means the science of Islamic laws.

Faqíh (pl. *fuqahâ'*) means the expert of *fiqh*. The terms “*mujtahid*” and “*faqíh*” mean the same.

THE IMPORTANCE OF *IJTIHÂD*

Is *ijtihâd* necessary? If Islam is a religion which is to stay till the end of time, then there must always be some people who can guide the Muslims in the changing circumstances of time and of place. After the Prophet of Islam, the most ideal persons to guide Muslims were the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt. However, the Present Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi (a.s.) has gone into the Occultation and will re-appear when Allâh wishes him to appear. So what is to be done in the mean-time? Are the Shí'ahs to suspend the *sharí'ah*? No, of course, not! Islam is the religion for all times and places.

The Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt had foreseen the time of the Occultation and had prepared their followers for the situation in which they will not be in direct contact with their Imam. This preparation was done

by training the Shī'ahs in the science of Islamic laws, or in other words, in *ijtihād*. *Ijtihād* is an essential phenomenon for the survival of the Islamic *sharī'ah* during the Occultation of the Imam (a.s.). Without the system of *ijtihād*, we would not be able to apply Islamic laws in the rapidly changing circumstances of human society.

Ijtihād is not only permissible, but essential from the Islamic point of view. It is an obligation in Islam to study everything which is necessary for the spiritual development and material well-being of the Muslim community. However, this obligation is of the category which is known as "*wājib kifā'i*."¹ In the present instance, for example, Islamic society needs experts in the medical sciences, in physics and chemistry, in engineering, education; and as long as there is a lack of expertise in these areas, it is an obligation on the community as a whole to acquire it. This means that a group of Muslims must devote themselves to research so as to benefit the Islamic people. Similarly, an Islamic society without experts in the *sharī'ah* cannot properly consider itself Islamic, and so it is an obligation for a group of persons from this society to devote themselves to the study of the religious sciences to provide proper guidance to all Muslims.

This is such an important obligation that Allāh has exempted those who go to seek religious knowledge from the duty of *jihād*. He says: "*It is not (right) for the believers to go forth all together (for jihād). So why should not a party from every section of them (the believers) go forth to become learned in the religion, and to warn their people when they return to them-so that haply they may beware?*" (9:122)

It is clear from many narrations that the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt (a.s.) used to be pleased whenever any of their companions taught religion or gave legal rulings (*fatwa*) to others. There are several documented cases of Shī'ahs who lived far from Medina asking the Imam of their

1 An obligation which is on every member of the community as long as it is unfulfilled; but as soon as some person or persons has fulfilled it, it is no longer an obligation on those who have not fulfilled it.

time to appoint someone in their area to adjudicate between them in religious problems: Zakariyyah bin Ādam al-Qummi and Yunūs bin 'Abdu 'r-Rahmān, for example, were named by Imam 'Ali ar-Riza (a.s.), to solve disputes in their own districts.²

In a famous *hādīth*, 'Umar ibn Hanzalah asked Imam Ja'far as-Sādiq (a.s.) about the legality of two Shī'ahs seeking a verdict from an illegitimate ruler in a dispute over a debt or a legacy. The Imam's answer was that it was absolutely forbidden to do so. Then Ibn Hanzalah asked what the two should do, and the Imam replied: "They must seek out one of your own who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well-acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as judge over you..."³

Besides these *ahādīth*, we have quite a few sayings of the Imams which tell us what to do if we come across two *ahādīth* which are contradictory or semi-contradictory - and solving the contradictory *ahādīth* is one of the functions of *ijtihād*. These types of *ahādīth* are known as *al-akhbār al-'ilājiyyah*, the *ahādīth* which solve the problems in the process of *ijtihād*.

What we have mentioned above clearly shows that *ijtihād* is necessary for the perpetuity of the Islamic legal system.

WAS NOT *IJTIHÂD* FORBIDDEN IN THE EARLY SHĪ'AH SOURCES?

There are some sayings of the Shī'ah Imams (a.s.), some writings of their companions and that of our early '*ulamâ*' which severely condemn the use of *ijtihād*. This has created confusion among non-specialist readers and has given rise to the question whether or not *ijtihād* was permitted in Shī'ah Islam.

2 Al-Āmili, Shaykh Hurr, *Wasâ'ilu 'sh-Shī'ah*, vol. 18 (Beirut: Dār Ihyâi 't-Turâthi 'l-Islâmi, 1391 AH) p. 106-107.

3 Al-Kulayni, *al-Furû' mina 'l-Kâfi*, vol. 7, p. 412.

This confusion can be easily sorted out by studying the changes undergone by the word “*ijtihâd*.” The word *ijtihâd* was used for the first time by a Sunni school of *fiqh* in the meaning of *ra’iy*. *Ra’iy* means “a subjective opinion, an opinion based on one’s personal judgement as opposed to that of the Qur’ân and the *hâdîth*.” In this sense, “*ijtihâd*” was by itself an independent source of the *sharî’ah* laws besides the Qur’ân and the *sunnah*. Abu Hanifah, the founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of *fiqh*, was the main proponent of this system of *ijtihâd*.⁴ The term *ijtihâd* continued to be used exclusively in the meaning of *ra’iy* up until the early seventh Islamic century.

In the seventh Islamic century, some of the Shî’ah ‘*ulamâ*’ started using the term *ijtihâd* in a different and new meaning. They used the term “*ijtihâd*” for “the *process* of deriving the laws of the *sharî’ah* from its sources.” In the first meaning, “*ijtihâd*” stands alongside the Qur’ân and the *sunnah* as an *independent source* of the *sharî’ah* laws; in its new meaning, “*ijtihâd*” is a process of deriving the *sharî’ah* laws from the Qur’ân and the *sunnah*. The first Shî’ah scholar to use the term “*ijtihâd*” in its new meaning was Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 676 A.H.) in his *al-Ma’ârij*. Al-Hilli says, “*Ijtihâd* means to strive for deriving the *sharî’ah* laws from their sources.”⁵

The change through which the meaning of “*ijtihâd*” has undergone clears the confusion about the legality of *ijtihâd*: some of the sayings of the Imams (a.s.), the writings of their companions and the early Shî’ah ‘*ulamâ*’ condemn *ijtihâd* in its pre-7th century meaning of “*ra’iy*”; they are not opposing the *ijtihâd* in the post-7th century

4 *Istisân*, *istislâh* or *maslahah*, and *ta’awwul* are different forms of *ijtihâd* in the meaning of *ra’iy*. All these terms mean the application of personal discretion in legal decisions.

5 See as-Sadr, S. Muhammad Bâqir, *Durûs fi ‘Ilmi ‘l-‘Usûl*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Daru ‘l-Kitâb, 1978) pp. 55-60; also see Mutahhari, M., “*Ijtihâd dar Islâm*,” in *Bahsi darbarah-e Marji’iyyat wa Rûhâniyyat* (Tehran: Shirkat-e Intishar, 2nd ed.) pp. 37-42. Mutahhari mentions ‘Allâmah Hilli (d. 726 AH) as the first user of the term *ijtihâd* in its new meaning but Sadr has shown that it was used before ‘Allamâh by his uncle the Muhaqqiq al-Hilli.

meaning of “the process of deriving the *sharí'ah* laws from their sources.” The condemned *ijtihâd* is a source of the *sharí'ah* laws, while the recommended *ijtihâd* is only the process of deriving the *sharí'ah* laws from their sources. The permissibility of *ijtihâd* in its post-7th century meaning is beyond any doubt.

THE PROCESS OF *IJTIHÂD*

The process of deriving the *sharí'ah* laws from their sources is based on two main branches of Islamic sciences: *usûlu 'l-fiqh* and *fiqh*. “*Usûlu 'l-Fiqh*” is the science of the method of deriving the *sharí'ah* laws - it is the methodology of *ijtihâd*. “*Fiqh*” is the practice of *ijtihâd* - it is the process of deriving the *sharí'ah* laws. In *usûlu 'l-fiqh*, the *mujtahid* studies the method of *ijtihâd*; in *fiqh*, he uses that method to derive the *sharí'ah* laws. Thus, *usûlu 'l-fiqh* is the theory of *ijtihâd* whereas *fiqh* is the practice of *ijtihâd*.

In the following pages, I would like to give an outline of *usûlu 'l-fiqh* and *fiqh* to familiarize the reader with the system of *ijtihâd*.

A. *USÛLU 'L-FIQH*

The first and fore-most issue to be discussed in *usûlu 'l-fiqh* is about “the binding authority of conviction” (*hujjiyyatu 'l-qat'*). The validity of conviction is determined by intellectual reasoning. This is the corner-stone of *ijtihâd*; it means that the main basis of determining a source of *sharí'ah* is to see whether or not one can achieve conviction about the laws derived from that source.

If a *mujtahid* finds that a particular source for example, the Qur'ân, is such that he can achieve conviction about the laws derived from it, then such a source is considered by him as a valid and reliable source for *ijtihâd*. This process divides the potential sources of *sharí'ah* laws into two: convincing and non-convincing.

CONVINCING (QAT'I) & NON-CONVINCING (DHANNI) SOURCES

In examining the potential sources of the *sharí'ah*, a *mujtahid* may find two kinds of sources: either the source creates conviction about the laws derived from it or not. In the first case, it is known as *dalil qat'i* – a convincing proof, a cogent proof, a proof which creates conviction about the proven laws. In the second case, the source is named as *dalil dhanni* - a presumptive proof, a proof based on mere assumption.

The *mujtahid* will consider the *dalil qat'i* (the convincing proof) as a valid source for the *sharí'ah* laws. But he will not consider the *dalil dhanni* as such because *dalil dhanni* does not create conviction it just gives rise to assumption. A *mujtahid* cannot rely on a *dhanni* proof or source for deriving laws unless the *sharí'ah* itself approves its use for this purpose. Below I will give examples of two *dhanni* sources, one approved by the *sharí'ah* and another disapproved by it.

THE FIRST EXAMPLE: Among the various categories of *hâdîth*, there is a category known as *khavar wâhid thiqah* - a *hâdîth* reported by a single reliable person. *Khavar wâhid thiqah* is a *dhanni* source. Why? Because a *hâdîth* reported by a single person does not create conviction about its contents even if the reporter is reliable; there is the chance of forgetting, misunderstanding or unintended misquotation on the part of the truthful, reliable reporter.

However, in spite of being a *dhanni* source, *khavar wâhid thiqah* is considered by most of Shí'ah *mujtahids* as a valid source for the *sharí'ah* laws. Why? Because the *sharí'ah* itself has approved it. Verse six of Chapter forty nine (Surah al-Hujuraat, 49:6) says that if a single report (*khavar wâhid*) comes from an unreliable (*fâsiq*) reporter, then it should not be accepted without further verification. The implication of this verse is that if a single report comes from a reliable (*thiqah*) reporter, then accept it without any need for further verification. Therefore, the *mujtahids* accept the single *hâdîth* narrated by a reliable reporter as a source for *sharí'ah* laws because the Qur'ân has implicitly approved it.

THE SECOND EXAMPLE: One of the *dhanni* sources for the *sharí'ah* laws is *qiyâs*. In Islamic laws, *qiyâs* means analogy. In *qiyâs*, you look at a *sharí'ah* law for one issue and then apply it to another issue because of the similarity that exists between the two. Let us suppose that "wine is *harâm*" is a proven law of the *sharí'ah*. You then look at beer and say that 'beer is like wine'; and then you apply the law of wine on beer - here the prohibition of beer has been proved on basis of *qiyâs*. *Qiyâs* is a *dhanni* proof, it does not create conviction because one cannot always know the real reason ('*illah* in Arabic, *ratio legis* in Latin) of the *sharí'ah* laws. And since the *qat'i* sources of the *sharí'ah* have not approved the use of *qiyâs* as a way of deriving Islamic laws, *qiyâs* is not accepted by our *mujtahids* as a valid source for *sharí'ah* laws.⁶

However, according to most *mujtahids*, if the *sharí'ah* has explicitly explained the *ratio legis* ('*illah*) of a particular law, then the *mujtahid* can generalize that law for other similar things by the means of *qiyâs*. And in such cases, it is known as *qiyâs mansûsi 'l-'illah* - an analogy based on the *ratio legis* explicitly explained (by the *sharí'ah*).

LEGAL (SHAR'I) & RATIONAL ('AQLI) PROOFS

All sources of the *sharí'ah*, whether *qat'i* or *dhanni*, can be of two types: *dalil shar'i* and *dalil 'aqli*. *Dalil Shar'i* means a source which emanates from religious texts; we may translate it as "legal proof." *Dalil 'aqli* means a source which emanates from intellectual arguments.

1. DALIL SHAR'I

Dalil Shar'i or the Legal Proof. The *dalil shar'i* consists of the Qur'ân and the *sunnah* - the two main sources of the *sharí'ah*. The *dalil shar'i* is divided into two: (a) Oral Proof like the Qur'ân and the *hâdîth*. (b) Non-Oral Proof like the practice of the *ma'sûm* and his 'silent approval' of the action done in his presence. The silent approval of a *ma'sûm* is known as "*taqrir*." However, even the non-oral proof reaches to us through the oral reports of the witnesses; therefore, for all

⁶ For the saying of the Imams of Ahlu 'l-Bayt in rejection of *Qiyâs* as a source of the *sharí'ah* laws, see the last chapter of *Wasâ'ilu 'sh-Shí'ah*, vol. 18.

practical purpose, both the oral and non-oral proofs are on the same level.

In order-to use the Legal Proofs in *ijtihâd*, the *mujtahid* has to study the following issues in *Usûlu 'l-Fiqh*:

(A) THE LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS

Some of the questions studied in this area are:

- i. Should I take all the words in *dalil shar'î* in their literal meaning?
- ii. Are metaphorical meanings of any use in *dalil shar'î* or not?
- iii. What are the imperative forms of words and what are their implications: does a command to do something automatically means the one is forbidden from its opposite?
- iv. What are the implications of the unconditional use of the word: do we generalize its contents?
- v. What is the implication of a conditional sentence: do we restrict its application?
- vi. What are the implications of a *nass*? (*Nass* means an oral proof containing a word which has only one meaning.)
- vii. What are the implications of a *mujmal*? (*Mujmal* means an oral proof containing a word which has more than one meaning and is used in those meanings equally.)
- viii. How do we use the context of the sentence to understand the *mujmal* word? For example, the word “*yad*” is used in the Qur’ân in the verses of *wudu*, *tayammum* and punishment for theft. The word “*yad*” means palms, forearm and hand. So how do you interpret the word “*yad*” in such verses? Well, in the verse of *wudu* it is simple because we have a context; the verse says that wash your “*yad* up to the elbows.” The context (“up to the elbow”) helps us in understanding the meaning of “*yad*” in the verse of *wudu*.

(B) THE PROBLEMS OF AUTHENTICITY

The *mujtahid* has also to study the ways of determining the authenticity of the Legal Proofs. This problem has given rise to the development of two sciences known as *‘Ilmu ‘r-Rijâl* and *Dirâyatu ‘l-Hâdîth*.

Ilmu 'r-Rijāl literally means 'knowledge about men,' it deals with the biography and character of the narrators of *hādīth*. On basis of this knowledge, the '*ulamā*' classify the narrators in different categories; and these categories in turn help in classifying the *hādīth* as authentic or acceptable or weak or fabricated or unreliable, etc. There are at least 38 different classifications of *hādīth*.

Dirāyatu 'l-Hādīth means the science of *hādīth*, and it deals mostly with the "chain of narration" as a whole instead of the individual narrators. This science helps the *mujtahid* in classifying certain narrators into groups and expedites their judgement about *hādīth* narrated through those particular channels.

Examples of how a *mujtahid* comes to know of a Legal Proof:

- i. *Tawâtur*: a narration reported by so many people that the very number of its reporters is enough to create conviction about the truth of its contents. A *hādīth* or an account of a ma'sûm's narrated in such a way is known as *mutawâtir*.
- ii. *Khabar wâhid thiqah*: a *hādīth* narrated by a single reliable narrator. We have already mentioned *khabar wâhid thiqah* earlier.
- iii. *Siratun mutasharri'ah*: the general attitude or practice of the religiously-minded companions of our Imams about a particular issue which is not found in the existing *hādīth* literature. This 'general attitude or practice' is known as *siratun mutasharri'ah*. This *sirah* indicates that an oral proof must have existed during their time. For example, if the prominent companions of Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.) did not attend the Friday prayers led by persons appointed by the rulers, then their attitude proves that the Friday prayer behind a person appointed by an illegitimate government is not valid - otherwise, the Imam would have objected to the actions of his companions.
- iv. *Ijmâ'*: means consensus. In *Usûlu 'l-Fiqh*, it refers to the consensus

of the early Shí'ah 'ulamâ' on an issue which is not found in the existing *hâdîth* literature. Such an *ijmâ'* indicates that an oral proof must have existed in their time on which they based their ruling. In Shí'ah jurisprudence, *ijmâ'* is not by itself a source of the *sharí'ah*; instead, it is a means of proving the existence of an oral proof which is now extinct.

2. DALIL 'AQLI

Dalil 'aqli means the intellectual reasoning or rational argument. In *Usûlu 'l-Fiqh*, *dalil 'aqli* means the intellectual prepositions which can be used as a source of deriving *sharí'ah* laws. However, the scope of intellectual prepositions in *sharí'ah* is limited; it is not like *ijtihâd bi 'r-ra'iy* (application of independent opinion). The intellectual prepositions are only used for deriving the details of the *sharí'ah* laws which exist.

For example, one such intellectual preposition says, "If an act is made obligatory (*wâjib*) by the *sharí'ah*, then it automatically follows that its essential preliminaries are also *wâjib*." This intellectual preposition is known in Arabic as "*muqaddimatu 'l-wâjib, wâjibun*." So if the *sharí'ah* says, "*Hajj is wâjib*," then the *mujtahid* can use the above mentioned intellectual preposition and derive the following laws: to travel to Mecca is *wâjib*; to acquire the means of transportation is *wâjib*, and to apply for a passport is *wâjib* - because without these preliminaries, *hajj* would be not be possible.

The intellectual prepositions which are used in *ijtihâd* are formed by studying, among other things, the following relationships between the *sharí'ah* laws:

- i. The relationship between *harâm* (forbidden) and *bâtîl* (invalid): if an act is *harâm*, is it automatically *bâtîl* also?
- ii. The relationship between *harâm* (forbidden) and *sahîh* (valid): can an act be valid but *harâm* at the same time?
- iii. The relationship between legislation of a law (*ja'l*) and its application on an individual (*fi'liyyah*).

- iv. The relationship between the laws and those on whom they are to be applied.
- v. The relationship between laws and its essential preliminaries as explained in the example of *hajj*.

THE PROCEDURAL RULES (*AL-USÛLU 'L-'ĀMALIYYAH*)

After defining the sources of the *sharī'ah*, the *mujtahid* has to set up a mechanism to solve the problems which have not been mentioned in the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*. For example, when a *mujtahid* looks into his sources for the ruling on smoking, he does not find anything specific on it. In *Usûlu 'l-Fiqh*, the *mujtahid* establishes some "procedural rules" or "practical principles" which he will use in such cases. These rules or principles are known as "*Al-Usûlu 'l-'Āmalīyyah*."

The *Usûlu 'l-'Āmalīyyah* are four: *asâlatu 'l-istishâb*; *asâlatu 'l-barâ'ah*; *asâlatu 'l-ihtiyât*; and *asâlatu 't-takhyîr*.

- i. *Asâlatu 'l-Istishâb* means the principle or rule of continuity. This principle is used in a case in which a person has "a previous certainty" and "a present doubt" about the same thing. For example, there is a glass of water on my table. I am sure that it was ritually pure (*tâhir*) in the morning, but now I doubt in its ritual purity. The principle of *istishâb* says that act on your previous certainty and ignore your present doubt because doubt cannot over-ride certainty.

This procedural rule has been taken from the following *hâdîth* of Imam Ja'far as-Sâdiq (a.s.) who said in the answer to Zurârah that "doubt cannot over-ride certainty; it can be over-ridden only by another certainty."

- ii. *Asâlatu 'l-Barâ'ah* means the principle of exoneration. This procedural rule is applied in a case which has not been mentioned, explicitly or implicitly, in the sources of the *sharī'ah*. *Asâlatu*

'l-Barâ'ah says that since the *sharī'ah* has no opinion in this issue, the Muslims are free to do whatever they like. For example, when dealing with the question of smoking, the *mujtahid* does not find any opinion about it in the sources of *sharī'ah*. In such a case, he would apply the principle of exoneration and say that "Smoking is not *harâm*."

- iii. *Asâlatu 'l-Ihtiyât* means the principle of precaution. This principle is applied in a case where there is only partial knowledge about the law; that is, in cases of *al-'ilmu 'l-ijmâli* - where there is a semi-doubt and a semi-certainty. In such cases, the *sharī'ah* expects us to act precautionarily. A most familiar example where this principle is applied is the case of Friday prayer during the major occultation of the Present Imam. We know that on Fridays, one of the two prayers - either Friday prayer or noon prayer - is definitely *wâjib*, but we do not know which one. Application of *asâlatu 'l-ihitiyât* in this case would mean that it is precautionarily better to pray both prayers to ensure that we have performed what was expected of us.
- iv. The last procedural rule is known as *Asâlatu 't-Takhyîr*. *Asâlatu 't-Takhyîr* which means the principle of choice. This principle is applied in cases similar to that of *asâlatu 'l-ihitiyât*, that is, semi-doubt and semi certainty. However, the principle of choice is applied where it is not possible to act on both sides of the issue. For example, when dealing with the noon or Friday prayer issue, some *mujtahids* may conclude that saying both prayers is not practical and specifying one without a clear evidence is not correct - therefore, they apply the principle of choice and say that one can say either Friday prayer or noon prayer.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTRADICTION

The last topic to be discussed in *Usûlu 'l-Fiqh* deals with the problem of contradiction in the proofs of the *sharī'ah*. The *mujtahid* has to layout a mechanism which he will use in case he comes upon contradiction in his sources. Our Imams have given quite a few guidelines to solve

such problems; as mentioned earlier, the *ahādīth* dealing with these problems are known as *al-akhbâr al-'ilâjīyyah*.

The contradiction between the proofs can be found in different forms and has to be solved in different ways:

(a) The contradiction between two oral-proofs can occur in following ways:

- i. A *nass* and a *hādīth* with an “apparent” meaning: the former is preferred over the latter. For example, one *hādīth* says, “Pray (*salli*) the mid-night prayer;” and another *hādīth* says, “Mid-night prayer is recommended (*mustahab*).” The first example is of a *hādīth* with an “apparent” meaning: it contains the word “pray” in imperative form which is used both for obligatory acts as well as for recommendation. The second example is of a *hādīth* which is a *nass*: it contains the words “recommended” which only means that the act is recommended and not *wâjib*. In this case, the *nass* will be preferred and used as a qualifier for the “apparent” *hādīth*.
- ii. One is of a general nature and the other is conditional: the conditional proof curbs the generalization of the former. For example, one *hādīth* says, “If you break your oath, then you must free a slave;” whereas another *hādīth* says, “If you break your oath, then you must free a Muslim slave.” The second *hādīth* will be preferred and used to curb the general implication of the first *hādīth*.
- iii. One deals with the legislation of laws and the other restricts its application on certain individuals: the later over-rides the former. For example, one *hādīth* says, “Respect the ‘*ulamâ*’”; while another *hādīth* says, “Do not respect the *fâsiq* ‘*ulamâ*’.” The latter *hādīth* limits the application of the former *hādīth*.

(b) If two authentic *ahādīth* contradict each other in such a way that it is not possible to reconcile them together, then both are to be discarded.

(c) If the contradiction is between “convincing oral-proof” and an non-oral, non-convincing proof, then the former is preferred.

(d) If there is contradiction between a convincing proof and a *dhanni* proof on the one hand and a procedural rule on the other, then the former is accepted because the latter is applied only when there is no proof at all.

(e) If there is a contradiction between the principles of *barâ'ah* and of *istishâb*, then the latter is preferred.

B. FIQH

In *fiqh*, the *mujtahid* derives the *sharî'ah* laws from the sources determined by him in *Usûlu 'l-Fiqh*.

All the issues discussed in *fiqh* are traditionally classified into four main groups. This classification was made by Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 676 A.H.) in his famous work of jurisprudence *Sharâya'u 'l-Islâm*. The following is a list of the subjects discussed in *fiqh* according to the traditional classification:

GROUP ONE: 'IBÂDÂT - THE ACTS OF WORSHIP:

Cleanliness, Prayers, Fasting, Wealth Tax, Annual Tax, Pilgrimage, *Jihad*, Bidding the good and forbidding the evil.

GROUP TWO: 'UQÛD - MUTUAL CONTRACTS:

Business transaction (*bay'*), Mortgage (*rahn*), Bankruptcy (*muflis*), Limitation of one's legal competence (*hajr*), Liability (*zimân*), Compromise in financial disputes (*sulh*), Partnership (*shirkah*), Silent Partnership in trade (*mudârabah*), Silent Partnership in agriculture (*muzâra'ah* & *musâqât*), Trusts (*wadi'ah*), Lending (*'âriyah*), Hiring (*ijârah*), Representing Others (*wikâlah*), Endowments (*waqf*), Deeds of Gifts (*hibah*), Making of Wills (*wisâyah*), Marriage (*nikâh*).

GROUP THREE: 'IYQĀ'ĀT - UNILATERAL INSTIGATIONS:

Divorce (*talâq*), Marital Disputes (*khul'*, *mubârât*, *dhihâr*, *ly'ân*, *iyâlâ'*), Emancipation of slaves (*itq*), Confessions in legal matters (*iqrâr*), Reward (*ja'âlah*), Vows (*yamîn*).

GROUP FOUR: AHKĀM - MISCELLANEOUS:

Hunting and Slaughtering (*sayd* and *dhibâhah*), Eating and Drinking (*at'imah* and *ashribah*), Misappropriation (*ghasb*), Neighbour's and Partner's first right to buy (*shaf'ih*), Revival of virgin land (*ihyâ'u 'l-mawât*), Inheritance (*irth*), Arbitration (*qadâ*), Testimony (*shahâdah*), Punishment (*hudûd*), Retaliation (*qisâs*), Blood-money or indemnity for bodily injury (*diyah*).

This was the old classification which has been used with slight changes till the present time. Here I would like to present a modern classification of *fiqhi* issues done by the late Sayyid Muhammad Bâqir as-Sadr in his *al-Fatâwa al-Wâdihah*.⁷ Ayatullâh as-Sadr of Najaf, Iraq was a shining star among the new generation *mujtahids*; unfortunately the Shī'ah world was deprived of his knowledge and leadership when he was tortured and killed by Saddam's regime in 1981. According to his classification, which we hope will be adopted by the *fiqhi* circles of our time all the *sharī'ah* laws are divided into four groups:

GROUP ONE: 'IBĀDĀT - THE ACTS OF WORSHIP:

Cleanliness, Prayers, Fasting, Pilgrimage to Mecca.

GROUP TWO: FINANCIAL LAWS:**(a) ON SOCIAL LEVEL:**

Zakat, *Khums*, Land Tax (*khirâj*), Tax on the non-Muslims under the protection of an Islamic government (*jaziyyah*), Spoils of war (*anfâl*).

(b) ON INDIVIDUAL LEVEL:

i. The laws about the means of possession: revival of virgin land,

⁷ Sadr, S. M. Bâqir, *al-Fatâwa al-Wâdihah* (Najaf, 1976) pp. 46-47.

hunting, by-products of one's own property, inheritance, loan, mortgage, deeds of gifts, etc.

- ii. The laws about the use of possessions: Business transactions, Exchange of commodities based on compromise, Partnership, Endowment, Legacy, etc.

GROUP THREE: PERSONAL LAWS:

Marriage, Divorce, Marital affairs, Eating, Drinking, Dressing, Vows, Oaths, Hunting, Slaughtering, Bidding good and forbidding evil, etc.

GROUP FOUR: SOCIAL LAWS:

Governance, Judiciary, Penal Code, *Jihad*, etc.

We may add in the list of “social laws” the new chapter started by Ayatullâh al-Khu’i known as *Kitâbu ’l-Mushtarikât* (the Book of Public Property)⁸ which deals with the laws about public road, mosques, schools, welfare homes, rivers and streams, lakes and oceans, and mines.

* * *

8 Khu’i, S. Abu ’l-Qasim, *Minhâju ’s-Sâlihiyn*, vol. 2 (Najaf, 1394) pp. 174-181.

A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE OF IJTIHÂD

The sciences of *usûlu 'l-fiqh* and *fiqh*, like any other science, have evolved and expanded with the passage of time. But during the last hundred years, especially since the emergence of Shaykh Murtaza al-Ansari (1214-1281 A.H.), these two sciences have expanded greatly and rapidly. In light of this positive development, an idea has been floating among the experts of *fiqh* since the death of Ayatullâh Husayn Burujardi about compartmentalization of *ijtihâd*.

The first person who raised this issue was Shaykh 'Abdu 'l-Karîm Hâ'iri Yazdi (1276-1355 A.H.), who has the credit of revitalizing the Hawza 'Ilmiyyah of Qum. Shaykh Hâ'iri's student, Shahid Murtaza Mutahhari brought this idea in a public forum for the first time in a speech at the seminar organized after the demise of Ayatullâh Burujardi in early sixties. He says, "It is better that *fiqh* be divided into different compartments, and that each group, after attaining the general ability of *ijtihâd*, should specialize in one particular area of *fiqh*."¹

This idea is very noble. But two recent developments in the Shī'ah world have made this idea into a necessity. First, the Islamic revolution in Iran has availed an unprecedented opportunity for the Shī'ah *mujtahids* to work on political, economic, social and moral problems which the Shī'ah community faces in Iran. Second, the large scale migration of Muslims to the West has given rise to issues and problems which were unheard of before. Expecting a single person to fully and comprehensively provide guidance for all problems is asking for too much. The only solution for the future of the *sharī'ah* is nothing but the compartmentalization of *ijtihâd*.

However, this is not something which can emerge or be created overnight; it has to take its due course. After a couple of generations, hopefully, we might have *mujtahids* specializing in four different areas of *fiqh*:

¹ Mutahhari, "*Ijtihâd dar Islam*," p. 61.

1. Acts of worship (*'ibâdât*);
2. Economic problems;
3. Personal laws;
4. Social and Political issues.

And the Shí'ahs of that time will be doing *taqlid* of either four different *mujtahids* or of a council of *ijtihâd* composed of *mujtahids* specializing in their respective fields.

In short, the dynamic spirit inherited by the Shí'ah '*ulamâ*' from their Imams will keep the light of *ijtihâd* shining in one form or another. The future, *al-hamdu lillâh*, is bright.

ABOUT THE BOOK

No religion governs the lives of its followers as comprehensively as Islam. After all “Islam” means total submission to the Almighty. The code of law which governs a Muslim’s entire life is known as the *SHARÍ’AH*.

The first two chapters of *An Introduction to the Islamic Sharí’ah* explains the concept of the *Sharí’ah*. Chapter III deals with *taqlíd*, the most common way of following the shariah. And Chapter IV tackles the tendency of rationalizing the *Sharí’ah* laws. Finally. Chapter V takes the reader into the world of Shí’ah jurists (*mujtahids*) and the system which they use for deriving *Sharí’ah* laws from the sources of Islam.

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